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1 Introduction
Cavell, Literary Studies, and the 
Human Subject: Consequences of 
Skepticism
Richard Eldridge and Bernard Rhie
For over fifty years, Stanley Cavell has been giving voice to some of the 
most innovative and independent-minded philosophical ideas of the 
late modern era. By synthesizing lessons about ordinary language he 
first learned from J. L. Austin with the teachings of the later Wittgen-
stein, Cavell early on developed a radically original interpretation of 
skepticism that would go on to inform all his subsequent philosophical 
investigations. For Cavell, skeptical doubt about the external world or 
other minds is neither an intellectual error in need of logical refutation 
(as philosophy has traditionally assumed), nor an ill-formed worry that 
we might readily put behind us, but a reflection of the inescapable fini-
tude that characterizes every human life. Skepticism is thus an existen-
tial condition that is inevitably lived, whether destructively or 
productively. Finite human beings are bereft of knowledge of meta-
physical absolutes and given over always to the active claiming of 
reason, fruitfully or tyrannically, as may be. Tracing out the myriad 
manifestations and sometimes tragic, sometimes comic consequences of 
the truth of skepticism in various regions of human life and culture, 
Cavell has throughout his long career produced a remarkable series of 
adventurous and wide-ranging reflections on philosophy, literature, 
film, and music.
Nowhere is the revolutionary promise of Cavell’s novel approach to 
philosophy more evident than in his numerous, and justly famous, 
interpretations of literary texts, from Shakespeare’s King Lear to Tho-
reau’s Walden, and from Emerson’s “Experience” to Beckett’s Endgame. 
The art of attentive, careful reading lies at the very heart of Cavell’s 
conception of philosophical method; reason can be claimed produc-
tively only through patient attention to, and apt modification of, past 
efforts at such claiming. The philosopher’s activity therefore resembles 
the compositional activity of the modernist writer, seeking to make new 
sense through situated engagements with, and departures from, precur-



























































































































































































2 Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies
energy to the study of literary texts, where efforts to find and make 
sense are foregrounded over proofs and fixed results. And given his 
philosophical attention to questions of method (in literary study as well 
as elsewhere), it is also unsurprising that Cavell has often written about 
conceptual issues of interest to literary theorists, such as meaning, inter-
pretation, metaphor, genre, and so on. Arguably no other living philoso-
pher has done as much as Cavell to show the common cause shared by 
literature and philosophy, where both only stand to lose by failing to 
acknowledge and embrace the claims of the other. 
It would seem, therefore, that literary critics, in particular, would 
have much to gain by engaging seriously with Cavell’s work. Yet wide-
spread admiration for Cavell by literary critics has only infrequently 
resulted in anything discernable as real intellectual influence. Indeed, 
the ambivalent reception of Cavell in literary studies (an odd mixture of 
admiration and apathy, which seems to treat him as worthy of praise yet 
somehow safe to ignore) is a vexing curiosity: obviously held in high 
esteem, he is rarely cited, and more rarely yet do his insights and ideas 
establish the terms of professional debate within literary studies about a 
given intellectual issue, whether theoretical or interpretive. Compared 
to the palpable influence upon literary studies of others of Cavell’s 
 philosophical contemporaries (Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan, or now 
Levinas and Deleuze, to name only the most obvious) the extent to 
which Cavell has been overlooked, even avoided, by literary critics is 
striking indeed.
It is a methodological principle of Wittgenstein’s (and thus Cavell’s) 
therapeutic and conversational approach to philosophy that no philo-
sophical account or therapy can be accepted as correct if the person to 
whom it is offered cannot recognize him- or herself in its terms. (Freud-
ian psychoanalysis is also an important influence on Cavell’s commit-
ment to this thought.) Indeed, such recognition is criterial of an account’s 
truth: for Wittgenstein and Cavell, there is no philosophical knowledge 
that is not first validated as self-knowledge, as new knowledge about 
one’s own commitments, longings, wishes, needs, and fantasies, where 
that knowledge is found at least good enough by (some) others and by 
oneself over (some) time. 
If we take Cavell’s project seriously, no one can compel another (even 
by means of logic) to accept the truth of a particular philosophical 
account, such as about the privacy (or publicity, for that matter) of 
mental states: each participant in the philosophical conversation must 
recognize and authenticate the truth of a particular account for herself. 
Since philosophical accounts or accountings aim at (new) self-know-
ledge, the demand to arrive at recognition and authentication 
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puts pressure on the subject and its commitments as they stand. This 
pressure is likely to prove, at various times, off-putting, outrageous, 
entrancing, and risky. There is, moreover, no fixed, rule-circumscribed 
method for relieving this pressure, nor any possibility of getting free of 
it once and for all.
In the absence of freely given agreement, then, there is no alternative 
to further philosophical conversation. It follows, therefore, that if most 
literary critics have to date been unable to recognize themselves and 
their professional concerns in Cavell’s work, then this cannot (in good 
faith) simply be blamed on them (say, for not being able to grasp its 
logical truth). The true student of Cavell or Wittgenstein can, in the face 
of such disagreement or indifference, do nothing other than attempt 
once again—with as much grace, tact, and sympathy as possible—to 
continue and deepen the critical conversation, acknowledging the mis-
understandings and sincere differences of opinion that have brought 
that conversation, in the past, to the awkward silence that, in most quar-
ters, characterizes its present condition.
We believe that there can be no reframing of Cavell that will make 
him newly interesting to literary scholars in the present that is not, at the 
same time, a therapeutic uncovering of the resistances that have led to 
the repression of his voice and work in the past. The two tasks—taking 
up the critical past so as to engage productively with interests and work 
that lie, so far, aslant Cavell’s, and reanimating his work for the future—
must go hand in hand. What, then, might be the nature of the intellec-
tual resistance that has led literary critics, as it were, to avoid Cavell? 
Why might Cavell’s voice and thought have failed to influence the liter-
ary critical community? Addressing these questions is a principal task 
and accomplishment of the essays that follow, and we cannot nor would 
we wish to preempt their detailed work. But it may nonetheless be 
helpful to have on hand our articulation of some very general suspicions 
about sources of resistance to Cavell within great stretches of literary 
studies, suspicions that we initially articulated in this way to our con-
tributors, as we invited them then to go further. 
We begin with the observation that ordinary language philosophy 
(so crucial to Cavell’s work) is often, in its appeals to “what we say 
when,” taken to be a form of “commons-room” authoritarianism that is 
both class-biased and inattentive to the varieties of demotic speech. This 
widely held view has certainly been one stumbling block to the general 
acceptance of ordinary language procedures in literary studies. In our 
view, however, this understanding of ordinary language philosophy is 
badly mistaken. There is, to be sure, a normativity to ordinary language: 
Cavell has always emphasized the “simultaneous tolerance and 
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intolerance of words” (CR 186) and has made clear that words cannot be 
given just any meaning or reach. But the normativity of ordinary lan-
guage appeals to “what we say” is not ideological in nature, arbitrarily 
invoking some imagined community’s customs as a fixed standard (as a 
skeptical cultural studies critic might think). Nor do such appeals work 
by invoking a set system or framework of linguistic rules (as more tradi-
tionally minded analytic philosophers might believe). Instead, for 
Cavell, the appeal to ordinary language is entered precisely when the 
very existence of any “we” is in doubt, and claims to “what we say” are 
by their very nature vulnerable, naked, and exposed (subject to rebuke, 
indifference, or any other number of ways such claims might misfire). 
Therefore, appeals to ordinary language work, when they work at all, 
by effecting a liberating transformation—a sense of arrival at felt right-
ness—in the ear both of the one entering the claim and the ear of anyone 
who follows its rightness. When this happens, a new or transformed 
“we” is composed or revealed, consisting of new or transformed sub-
jects, who have entered into this new we from the resources of their own 
subjectivities. This is as much true of the one entering the claim to what 
we say, from within a situation of crisis, as of the ones, if any, who 
respond. Consolidation of one’s subjectivity in possession of an articu-
lated sense of what we say is a new achievement for any human subject, 
and the pursuit of this begins in doubt and remains fraught with risk. 
We think this is an important (and hardly conservative) image of what a 
“we” can be, with profound implications not only for aesthetics but for 
ethics and political theory as well. 
Having addressed the stumbling block of misconceptions about 
“ordinary language,” however, we are now ready to suggest another—
and perhaps even deeper—reason that literary studies has found so 
little use for Cavell’s ideas: his humanism. The literary critic Garrett 
Stewart has, in fact, suggested that it is precisely Cavell’s affirmation of 
the concept of “the human” that has put him at odds with so much liter-
ary theory which, at the very historical moment Cavell was emerging on 
the philosophical scene, believed it was putting “the human” behind it, 
to be discarded in the dustbin of the metaphysical past, in favor of more 
objective and less human-subject-centered study of the linguistic and 
material-cultural conditions of the production and reception of texts. 
The concept of the human is quite obviously at the very heart of Cavell’s 
project, and its fundamental importance is evident in Cavell’s reliance 
on, and frequent invocation of, a series of related concepts that, in our 
current critical environment, must seem woefully outdated to many: in 
particular, concepts like “voice,” “self,” and “subject.” Cavell employs 
these terms freely, and without irony; in fact he declared in The Claim of 
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Reason that he practiced ordinary language philosophy in order “to 
reclaim the human self from its denial and neglect by modern philoso-
phy” (CR 154). Sentiments and intellectual commitments like these, we 
suggest, have a great deal to do with why (however much Cavell’s crea-
tivity, style, and specific critical insights may occasionally be admired 
by literary critics) his work has resisted ready assimilation to literary 
criticism under a dominant anti- or post-humanist dispensation.
We believe Stewart has identified something very important here, 
and indeed recent literary theoretical work that engages with Cavell 
confirms Stewart’s suggestion about the importance of the idea of “the 
human” to the allergic reaction literary theory has had to Cavell. Con-
sider, for instance, the recently published volume, Philosophy and Animal 
Life (Columbia 2008), which collects an essay by Cora Diamond on J. M. 
Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, along with responses to Diamond by 
Cavell, John McDowell, and Ian Hacking, all introduced by the decon-
structive literary critic Cary Wolfe. In his introduction, Wolfe argues that 
the “fundamental difference” between Derrida and thinkers like Cavell 
(and Diamond) is that the latter hold on (nostalgically, mistakenly) to 
the importance of the concept of “the human” for philosophical (espe-
cially moral) thought, while Derrida, on the other hand, has shown us 
how to overcome that outmoded metaphysical category. Reading 
Wolfe’s stimulating and provocative introduction, we could not help but 
recall Cavell’s oft-repeated point that there is in fact nothing more 
human than the desire to transcend the human (to become, even, 
somehow inhuman or post-human). Far from actually succeeding in 
leaving behind (by deconstructing) the category of the human, we 
believe that poststructuralist antihumanism is itself but another (very 
sophisticated) expression of one of the deepest and most characteristic of 
human impulses—the wish humans have always had to transcend their 
own finitude. This is obviously a contentious claim, one which needs to 
be handled with care, and this is certainly not the place to settle respon-
sibly such a complex and consequential issue. All we wish to suggest is 
the centrality of the concept of the human both to Cavell’s project and to 
literary theoretical resistance to it. Therefore, any attempt to make Cavell 
speak to contemporary literary studies must directly address (indeed 
defend) his interest in, and allegiance to, the human (the human voice, 
the human self). If, as we believe, theoretical antihumanism (or more 
recently, posthumanism) is indeed one of the key reasons Cavell’s work 
continues to suffer from a strange aura of untimeliness—of a curious 
“lack of fit” with contemporary critical concerns—then a fresh consid-
eration of the Cavellian understanding of the human must play a central 
role in any reframing of that work for a literary critical audience.
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When Cavell wrote that he hoped to reclaim the human self from its 
neglect by modern thought, he was, in fact, not simply summarizing 
one goal of The Claim of Reason alone, but succinctly characterizing the 
ambit of his entire intellectual career. What it means to be a human 
being, to lead a (truly) human life, is exactly what Cavell has always 
been asking after. That he finds it necessary to continue to ask should 
immediately suggest how complex and sophisticated is his (still unfold-
ing) account, and it should give us pause before we too quickly identify 
Cavell’s vision of humanity with the metaphysical “universal human 
substance” that is generally the target of suspicious antihumanists. 
Indeed, for Cavell, there is nothing more uncanny than the human, just 
as there is, in a way, nothing more extraordinary than the ordinary. Or 
as Cavell himself put it in characterizing the sense of the uncanniness of 
the ordinary—and of the human—that lies at the heart of his work: “I 
might describe my philosophical task as one of outlining the necessity, 
and the lack of necessity, in the sense of the human as inherently strange, 
say unstable, its quotidian as forever fantastic” (IQO 154).
Human beings are then always (at least potentially) haunted by expe-
riences of the strangeness of themselves to themselves and to others: 
human selfhood is a fragile achievement to be sought (to be claimed and 
then re-claimed) and never simply some stable psychic state or meta-
physical substance to be complacently stood upon. Indeed, one can be 
summoned or called, surprisingly, by things, events, and persons that 
one does not anticipate or expect, to a sense of one’s non-self-present-
ness, one’s radical otherness to oneself, and then (sometimes, but then 
again sometimes not) to a further sense of reintegration of the self in the 
recovery or establishment of one’s human voice. These claims apply 
equally to a human community’s possibilities of a sense of strangeness 
to itself and of reconsolidation. Both ordinary language philosophy as 
Cavell sees it and Cavellian reading (of writers like Emerson and 
Thoreau) track what might be called essentially finite pursuits of selfhood 
and community under conditions of uncanny loss and fallenness. To 
attempt in these conditions to stand on what is said, where that is taken 
to be fixed as a matter of linguistic or social fact, is to follow Torvald in 
A Doll’s House in taking himself to be “above reproach” and thus to 
refuse the passionate utterance of another from within a moment of 
crisis. To attempt to control the terms of judgment absolutely, say by 
insisting on proofs one can hold within one’s own consciousness apart 
from any conversation, is to follow Othello in his desperate impulse 
toward intactness. Nothing is more human than such efforts. But they 
are efforts of situated, finite selves, driven by anxieties and wishes they 
have taken on via their particular routes of fragile entry into language 
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and human community. Cavellian ordinary language philosophy and 
Cavellian criticism undertake to describe, understand, assess, enact, and 
improve upon such finite pursuits of selfhood and community from 
within a sense of shared situations and complexities of impulse, rather 
than from a self-certain and all-knowing place apart, from which the 
human could be taken as already specified, factually or ideally. Such, at 
least, is our sense of the complexity and dynamism of Cavell’s multilay-
ered account of the human, and we think the reclamation of the human 
self against its neglect by modern thought is as necessary and urgent 
today as it was when Cavell first began his long career.
Roughly thirty pages from the end of The Claim of Reason, there is a 
section entitled, somewhat cryptically, “proving the existence of the 
human” (CR 465–68). Prior to that, the bulk of Parts I, II, and III of The 
Claim of Reason is devoted to close analysis of the roles of criteria and of 
claims about criteria in philosophy and in human life. Some principal 
results that emerge are that criteria function as standards for reasonable 
judgment and that claims about what our criteria are are properly 
entered when those criteria have somehow fallen into doubt (perhaps 
someone is ignoring them), so that we need, or someone needs, remind-
ing of them. When it comes, however, to criteria for knowledge of the 
presence of a generic object—that is, an ordinary object of common 
experience such as a tomato or an envelope or a human hand; cases in 
which there could be no issue of distinguishing a specially tricky or dif-
ficult object (say, a pi-meson trace in a cloud chamber) from others, 
where expertise may be required—then the only thing that a request to 
know one’s criteria for saying “I know” could mean is that the very exist-
ence before one of the generic object, and so of the world as a whole, is 
somehow called into question. Once it has been thus called into ques-
tion, then there is no way back to establishing contact with, let alone 
intimacy with, objects in the world in general via contact with some-
thing else (sense-data, ideas, impressions). Appeals to what our criteria 
are are impotent to establish the existence of generic objects. The skeptic 
already knows everything there is to know about when we ordinarily say 
“I know” (that there’s cheese in the cupboard or a goldfinch in the 
garden), and for him that is not enough. The criteria for ordinary 
knowing have lost their grip on him, and no reminder of the availability 
of criteria in ordinary cases, for good enough practical purposes, will 
help. Hence, Cavell asks, “Shall we say that we have faith that the things 
of our world exist? But how is that faith achieved, how expressed, how 
maintained, how deepened, how lost?” (CR 243). 
The theme that thus arises of faithfulness vs. faithlessness, or of inti-
macy vs. alienation with the things and persons of a world, is then 
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woven through detailed accounts of language-learning and the forma-
tion of the human subject as a subject capable of judgment and of moral 
conversation. There is, we think, little if anything in the philosophical 
literature that is better than these pages—that is more perceptive, inti-
mately accurate, or phenomenologically acute in tracing the formation 
and vicissitudes of lives of human subjects who have emerged, 
somehow, without absolute ground in cognitive contact with an abso-
lute given, into a world of socially existent, contested, and sometimes 
resolvable, but sometimes irreparably divided, judgment-making. What 
it is to judge anything at all to be thus and so, exactly how others are 
present, always, within the practices of judgment and moral conversa-
tion (as, among other things, introjected images of power or cold 
 provokers of anxiety), but also how withdrawal and alienation from 
these practices can be possible and deeply tempting—all this is as good 
as it gets.
But there is also some danger that all of Parts I and II will be read, 
first, as intended to be foundational for the somewhat freer Part III, 
about morality, and Part IV about “the problem of others.” After all, 
Parts I and II are about the concepts and phenomena of knowledge and 
judgment, and surely (it will be thought) the task of the philosopher, 
and a task Cavell seems to be undertaking, is to get those concepts and 
phenomena right, before turning to the consequences of correct vs. 
incorrect understandings of these concepts and phenomena for other 
regions of human life. And, second, once so read, there is a danger that 
the enterprise will be assessed as a failure in being, let us say, too phe-
nomenological-descriptive and not systematic-theoretical enough. If we 
want to know what knowledge and judgment really are, would we not 
do much better (it may be argued) to look to empirical cognitive psy-
chology or, more recently, to talk of neural connections, MRI images, 
and brain regions, or perhaps to evolutionary psychology and biology? 
These styles of inquiry have, after all, begun even to invade literary 
studies. And the reason for this assessment is all too natural. If we want 
to know what knowing and judging are, shouldn’t we turn to a system-
atic, scientific account of what the evolved, biological-material, human 
organism is, at bottom, doing? Or, in a different idiom, why not pay 
attention to the social-material conditioning of human subjects, along 
the lines of Althusserian interpellation? Why not a material politics 
instead of and beneath descriptive-critical phenomenology?
In contrast, Cavell’s remarks about moments of hesitation, imitation, 
and intimacy felt and then ruptured within the scene of language-learn-
ing, and within the formation and continuing life of a human subject of 
judgment, can seem merely phenomenological, too surfacy. Sure, that’s 
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the way it looks to him, as a casual, non-scientific and not immediately 
political outsider, but why should we trust his impressions? Why should 
we worry so much about a liability or tendency to skeptical anxieties 
taken as “a natural expression of a creature complicated or burdened 
enough to possess language at all” (CR 140)? One way or another, let’s 
get serious about what’s really going on. 
It is against this background of worry that it is particularly useful to 
turn to the section “proving the existence of the human.” Here in par-
ticular we can see a history of the phenomena of knowing and judging, a 
history that situates and deepens the earlier phenomenology, just as the 
phenomenology informs the history. The resulting combination of phe-
nomenology and history into a philosophical anthropology should be 
read as a unified whole, and it should be understood as a reading of our 
history, a claim—tentative, defeasible, and yet potentially illuminat-
ing—about central topoi of that history and about how human nature is 
made manifest within it, both variously and recognizably.
So how does the history go? And what could a history of phenomena 
of knowing and judging have to do with the topic of proving the exist-
ence of the human? The topic itself is initially unclear. Surely I am a 
human being in virtue of my biological constitution, a fact that needs no 
proof, let alone one by me. So what is the task at issue, and how does it 
have a history?
Descartes and Rousseau are crucial figures. Cavell cites with approval 
Anthony Kenny’s observation that “Descartes’s innovation in the phil-
osophy of mind” is “the substitution of privacy for rationality as the 
mark of the mental” (CR 470). But we already know three things from 
the earlier remarks on criteria about Cavell’s views about the nature of 
this achievement:
(1) it cannot consist in the discovery that judgment begins in a private 
encounter with a purely internal mental object of judgment, for 
judgment as an activity begins only in and through initiation by 
others into the life of language;
(2) instead, a sense of one’s essential privacy is an expression of alien-
ation from common life; and
(3) there is no simple, straightforward route back from alienation to 
reintegration with the ordinary.
Because, we conjecture, of the development of increasingly specialized 
and skill-based modern labor, human beings in growing up must now 
pass through longer periods of training, including internal reflection on 
how complex tasks are best done in varying circumstances. Because, 
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further, of the development of market economies, social stations are less 
fixed than they once were, and it is less clear what is wanted or expected 
of anyone entering into grown-up life. The development of suitable 
skills and of broader modes of public comportment within a diverse 
society, for the sakes of both a wage and recognition as an accomplished 
grown-up, is now in principle open to everyone (even if for many still 
blocked in fact), but exactly how to take up this possibility is less speci-
fied than it was in a culture of direct apprenticeship within the way of 
life of one’s parents and clan. Descartes’ initial sense of privacy expresses 
this sense of a power to develop worthwhile skills coupled with uncer-
tainty about how to do so in detail, in ways that may generally be rati-
fied by others.
This sense of privacy is then even more marked in Rousseau. Rous-
seau’s sense of privacy verges on the paranoid, but also records a com-
mon-enough sense among modern human subjects. As Cavell describes 
it, Rousseau
has the sense [first] that he has become unknowable—private—
because to know him would be to know the sentiments of his 
heart—in particular, his pity for others and his fears of them—and 
the sentiments of his heart have become unintelligible to (inex-
pressible by) other human beings (as a result of what they per-
ceive as human progress); second, that our social bonds are not the 
realization but the betrayal of the social contract, in a word con-
spiracies, so that there is among us no public thing at all.
(CR 469)
As though literalizing and hyperbolizing Descartes’ sense of privacy as 
alienation, it is for Rousseau as if others were zombies and he were mad. 
Caught up in their routines of exercising skills and responding to the 
demands of others, but without any expressions of interest, feeling, and 
commitment in relation to their activities that are legible to him, Rous-
seau finds himself cast upon himself, “maddened through an isolation” 
(CR 469), as Cavell puts it. Perhaps many or most of us, much of the 
time, are lucky enough not to feel this sense of isolation. Work and 
family and participation in public institutions may be good enough. But 
then for some—perhaps for many, at least sometimes—perhaps not. 
And then, for Cavell, following Rousseau, one is first of all thrown 
back upon oneself. “To possess my existence” (as a being capable of 
feeling, interest, animation, and commitment) “I must declare it” (CR 
462). Rather than denying one’s condition in coldness, dullness, or a 
reversion to routine that foregoes hope, one must face “the 
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apprehension that human subjectivity, the concept of human selfhood, 
is threatened, that it must be found and may be lost; that if one’s exist-
ence is to be proven it can be proven only from oneself” (CR 465). 
But here simple assertion of one’s own interest as idiosyncratically 
one’s own will not do either. I might declare my interest in playing fif-
teenth century viola da gamba music or in the history of cricket or, say, 
in philosophy. But if no or very few others find sense and worth in what 
I then declare and do, then recognition will not be forthcoming, and the 
sense of moving as a ghost through a world of zombies will not cease. 
Instead, my declaration and enactment of my interests may and must be 
in “faithfulness to [the] desire [for] union or reunion, call it community” 
(CR 463). Somehow, the task of “the acknowledgment of the existence of 
finite others” (CR 463), with passions and interests different from one’s 
own, must be managed, but in such a way that some form of mutual 
sense is achieved and enacted, so that we are, or are no longer, for one 
another mere satellites around one another’s isolated egos or mere 
objects of instrumental use.
The good news is that Cavell holds out and declares hope that this 
can still be done, even if the work of acknowledgment and of the enact-
ment of interest is also never finished, but remains always to be redone. 
Drawing always on both ordinary language philosophy in its declar-
ation and discovery of what we really want to say, and also on the criti-
cism of modern works of art that aims at declaring what we feel in an 
encounter with the difficult and new, Cavell turns to literary texts and 
films—to Shakespeare, Coleridge, Thoreau, Hawks, and Capra, among 
many others—in order to track declarations and denials of interest, 
skeins of acknowledgment and avoidance. This mode of attention to the 
literary or filmic text is different from focusing on texts in a detached, 
positivistic spirit as mere shapes of black ink on white pages, and it is 
different, too, from focusing on ink-on-pages as produced and con-
sumed by impersonal social forces or movements of power. Those ways 
of proceeding have their points: deconstruction in directing our atten-
tions to textual ambiguities and ambivalences, to failures of control of 
the text by a single-presiding, self-present voice; various forms of New 
Historicism or Cultural Studies in directing our attention to the situa-
tion of the production and reception of texts within contested social and 
political life. There are insights to be won here, and Cavell does not 
deny them. Yet woven throughout and legible within both textual inde-
terminacies and plays of social contestation there remains too, for 
Cavell, an agon of human subjectivity, poised between acknowledg-
ment and avoidance, and seeking further and fuller accounts and enact-
ments of interest. Hence Cavell’s criticism is all at once characterological 
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(oriented toward texts and lines within texts as voiced by a subject), 
allegorical (in finding, always, partial successes and failures of contex-
tual enactments of interest), deconstructionist (in seeing language and 
culture as always inherited and to be inherited, in ways that outrun full 
control), and political (in seeing agons of the human played out in spe-
cific sociopolitical settings). The range, complexity, and intimacy of the 
form of attention that inhabits Cavell’s criticism are, in short, 
remarkable.
The epigraph to Part I of The Claim of Reason is a line from Ludwig 
Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity: “This philosophy does not rest on 
an Understanding per se, on an absolute, nameless understanding, 
belonging one knows not to whom, but on the understanding of man; 
—though not, I grant, on that of man enervated by speculation and 
dogma; —and it speaks the language of men, not an empty, unknown 
tongue” (cited CR 1). This implies that we can ask about any piece of this 
philosophy—or criticism or literature or film, in their affinities to phi-
losophy—: who is speaking or writing, here and now, in light of what 
occasions, and more specifically in light of exactly what kind of 
prompted alienation, what kind of occasioned failure of joint sense-
making? And it implies, second, that philosophy (or literature or criti-
cism) can still be written or spoken, that is, that what is then said or 
written need not be, always, merely personal or idiosyncratic, though 
that is always a risk when mutual isolation and alienation are the points 
of departure. It is possible that what reveal themselves as our interests in 
our lives will be declared, revealed, and enacted, that our sense, includ-
ing our differing contributions to it, will be found and made. A claim of 
reason—a claim about what we do or say, made in the interest of self-
knowledge, community, and the life of reason—can be entered and can, 
sometimes, be redeemed. Acknowledgment, an active responsiveness to 
others, can overcome avoidance; expressiveness can overcome dullness 
and repression. But either way, we are fated to move in the space 
between acknowledgment and avoidance (see CR 451), bereft of abso-
lute solutions, but with—at least it may be hoped—some possibilities of 
mutual, sense-making life, woven through continuing difference. One 
might hope to come productively, at least for a time, to “confront the 
culture with itself, along the lines in which it meets in me” (CR 125). 
Without fixed ground, without assurance of success, this is, Cavell 
argues, a task and a possibility that is allotted simultaneously to phil-
osophy, literature, and critical study. Whatever their relative differences 
from one another—philosophy’s turns to abstraction and impersonality, 
literature’s emphases on figuration and particular emplotment, and 
criticism’s mediating engagements involving all of theory, close reading, 
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history, and comparison—this is an image that can be, and in Cavell’s 
hands has been, immensely fruitful for understanding both human life 
and some central literary texts of that life. In the spirit of this thought, 
we hope for, urge, and prophetically expect a creative, open, renewed 
critical reception of Cavell within contemporary literary studies, in a 
way that accepts, but also deepens, literary studies’ current self-under-
standings and critical achievements. But of course only time will tell.
One major consequence of Cavell’s interest in the human subject in lan-
guage and culture and of his ways of doing both criticism and philoso-
phy is that there is rarely a sharp division between theoretical reflection 
and critical reading. Nor is any such sharp division evident among the 
essays that compose this volume. Nonetheless it seemed helpful enough 
to divide the essays provisionally into those that are concerned primar-
ily with canonical philosophical texts (Kant and Wittgenstein in particu-
lar) and with questions of aesthetic and critical theory and those that are 
concerned primarily with developing (and of course commenting on) 
practices of reading. We mention here the presence of this rough organi-
zational division that we have introduced in order to remind readers 
not to take it too seriously.
We are happy to conclude these introductory remarks by adding that 
it has been a continuous pleasure for us to work with our contributors to 
this volume. Not all editors of collections are in a position to say what 
we are able to say wholeheartedly: that our contributors produced their 
essays on time and were always graciously and imaginatively respon-
sive to comments and suggestions from us. We have the greatest confi-
dence in their powers and insights, both in general and as they are 
embodied in these essays, and we are grateful to them for their work.
